Building AI Agents: A Practical Guide to Production-Ready Systems
Building an AI agent is easy when the goal is a demo. Production requires a bounded task, scoped tools, durable state, approvals, observability, and a plan for moving repeatable work into deterministic software.

Building an AI agent means wiring a model to instructions, tools, durable state, a bounded loop, and controls, then proving it works on one narrow workflow before widening it. The model is the easy part. The tools, the state, and the approvals decide whether the agent survives production. For recurring work, the step that matters most comes last: move the parts the agent reasons through identically every run into deterministic code.
That is where Major fits. Major is the enterprise platform where agents build the software they run on. When an agent works out a repeatable step, it builds an app for it, with a managed database, storage, scoped permissions, and audit logs, then runs the app instead of reasoning through the step again. Reason once. Run forever.
This guide is for platform and AI leaders who need an agent that a security team will sign off on, and for operators who will own it after launch.
What building an AI agent actually means
OpenAI's definition is the cleanest one in circulation: "Agents are systems that independently accomplish tasks on your behalf." The same guide says applications that use LLMs without letting them control workflow execution "are not agents," which rules out chatbots, single-turn calls, and classifiers (A Practical Guide to Building Agents).
Anthropic draws the line in the same place. Workflows are "systems where LLMs and tools are orchestrated through predefined code paths." Agents are "systems where LLMs dynamically direct their own processes and tool usage" (Building Effective Agents).
So the artifact is a loop. A model receives a goal, picks an action, calls a tool, reads the result, updates state, and decides whether to continue. Everything else is a decision about what surrounds that loop.
Start with the workflow, then pick the model
The task boundary carries more weight than the model choice. An agent that triages support tickets can be tested against a fixed set of cases. An agent meant to "run finance ops" cannot be tested at all, because nobody can list what it is supposed to do. Draw the boundary around a workflow with an owner, an input, and an outcome someone would notice if it were wrong.
Write down the normal path, the exceptions, the steps that cannot be undone, and the person who answers for the result. Anthropic's advice is worth taking literally: "we recommend finding the simplest solution possible, and only increasing complexity when needed," which "might mean not building agentic systems at all." If the process is deterministic on paper, keep it deterministic in code and use the model for the one step that needs interpretation.
Test models on your own cases for quality, latency, structured output reliability, tool-call accuracy, and cost. Keep the model layer replaceable.
Tools, state, and the loop
Tools are the boundary between reasoning and consequence. Anthropic reported that on SWE-bench, "we actually spent more time optimizing our tools than the overall prompt." Give each tool a narrow schema, explicit permissions, validation, and errors the model can act on. A function like create_refund(order_id, amount) is safer and easier to evaluate than a general database tool that can write anywhere.
OWASP names the failure mode. LLM06:2025 Excessive Agency has a root cause of "excessive functionality; excessive permissions; excessive autonomy," and the mitigation is to avoid open-ended extensions and use "extensions with more granular functionality" (OWASP LLM06:2025).
State is where prototypes quietly break. A context window is a transcript, and a transcript is not a record. Durable state belongs in a database the application owns: workflow status, prior attempts, approvals, the evidence behind a decision. Anthropic's research-system writeup says it plainly: "Agents are stateful and errors compound," so they built systems that "can resume from where the agent was when the errors occurred" (How we built our multi-agent research system).
The loop needs timeouts, bounded retries, idempotency keys, and a defined failure path. Retries are where side effects duplicate, so check whether the first attempt landed before sending a payment, message, or record update again. Give every run an identifier that ties decisions, tool calls, results, and errors together.
Guardrails, approvals, and the audit trail
OpenAI recommends rating each tool by risk, including "read-only vs. write access, reversibility, required account permissions, and financial impact." High ratings pause for a check. Two triggers should route to a person: exceeding failure thresholds and high-risk actions such as canceling orders, authorizing large refunds, or making payments.
Enforcement belongs below the model. OWASP's guidance is to "implement authorization in downstream systems rather than relying on an LLM to decide if an action is allowed or not." A prompt instruction is a preference. A permission check in code is a control.
The audit question is the one that stops agent projects after launch. OWASP's agentic threat taxonomy calls it T8 Repudiation and Untraceability, where actions "cannot be traced back or accounted for due to insufficient logging or transparency" (Agentic AI: Threats and Mitigations). NIST's voluntary AI RMF gives a sharp test for your own logs: transparency answers "what happened," explainability answers "how," interpretability answers "why" (NIST AI RMF 1.0). Most agent traces answer the first question and stop.
Mistakes that sink agent builds
The expensive one is reaching for multiple agents before one has failed. Anthropic measured it: agents "use about 4x more tokens than chat interactions" and multi-agent systems "about 15x more tokens than chats." OpenAI's counsel is to "maximize a single agent's capabilities first."
The second is treating chat history as memory. It holds until the conversation ends, the window fills, or two runs need the same record.
The third is grading the answer instead of the run. Build a test set with edge cases, policy violations, tool failures, and ambiguous requests, then measure task success, tool selection, approval compliance, latency, and cost. This article does not cover evaluation methodology in depth. Scoring open-ended agent behavior is a harder problem and deserves its own piece.
How do you build an AI agent?
- Pick one bounded workflow with a named owner and a measurable outcome.
- Write the normal path, the exceptions, and the irreversible steps.
- Select a model by testing representative tasks, and keep it replaceable.
- Expose the minimum set of narrow, typed tools with their own permissions.
- Implement a bounded loop with timeouts, capped retries, and idempotency keys.
- Put durable state in an application database, not the context window.
- Gate high-risk tools behind approvals that record who approved what.
- Trace every run, then read the traces and compile steps that repeat identically into code.
Step eight separates a working prototype from a system that stays affordable at volume.
Build the support triage agent on Major
Take a concrete case: triaging inbound Zendesk tickets against Salesforce account data, with escalations in Slack. Here is how the pieces map.
- Connectors: Zendesk for tickets, Salesforce for account tier and contract terms, Slack for escalation and approvals. Each connection uses scoped credentials, so the agent can read a ticket without being able to edit an opportunity.
- The app that holds state: a triage app with a managed database for ticket status, prior attempts, routing decisions, and the evidence behind each one. A run can resume tomorrow because the record lives in the app, not in a conversation.
- The deterministic part: field extraction, tier lookup, SLA math, and routing rules become app code the agent built once and now runs. No tokens are spent re-deriving them.
- The agent's judgment: reading an ambiguous ticket, deciding whether it is a billing dispute or a bug report, and drafting the reply. These calls stay with the model.
- The trigger: a workflow fires on each new Zendesk ticket, calls the triage app, and pauses for a human in Slack when the action is high-risk.
- Governance: role-based access controls who can run and edit the app, and audit logs record each action with the credentials it used.
You can start building this on Major and have the first version running the same day.
What we believe about building agents
The repeatable stretch of an agent workflow should stop being a model problem. When a step's inputs, rules, and outputs are stable, re-deriving it on every run buys nothing and costs tokens, latency, and variance. Moving it into an app makes it deterministic because it is code, stateful because the app owns the records, and governable because permissions and logs attach where the action happens.
That has limits. The model still reasons, and the judgment calls stay probabilistic, so they need evaluation like any other model output. Major does not fix a badly scoped workflow. Draw the boundary badly and you get a deterministic app that does the wrong thing reliably.
More use cases by tool: More Slack use cases, More Zendesk use cases.
Start building on Major
Build your first predictable agent on Major: connect Zendesk, Salesforce, or Slack, let the agent turn its repeatable steps into a governed app, and keep the judgment calls where they belong.
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Frequently asked questions
- How do you build an AI agent?
- Pick one bounded workflow with a named owner and a measurable outcome. Choose a model by testing it on representative tasks from that workflow. Expose a minimum set of narrow, typed tools with their own permissions. Implement a bounded loop with timeouts, capped retries, and idempotency. Store durable state in a database, gate irreversible actions behind human approval, and trace every run.
- Can I build an AI agent without coding?
- Yes for assembly. No-code and low-code tools can wire up instructions, tools, and integrations well enough to reach a working prototype. Production adds requirements those tools rarely cover on their own: scoped credentials, durable state outside the context window, approval gates on irreversible actions, traces that survive an audit, and an evaluation set you run before every change.
- What are the main components of an AI agent?
- OpenAI's guide names three core components: a model for reasoning, tools for taking action, and instructions that define behavior. Production systems add four more that the guide treats as surrounding infrastructure. Durable state outside the context window, a bounded execution loop, guardrails and approval gates, and observability with an evaluation harness.
- Should I build a single-agent or multi-agent system?
- Single agent, until measurement forces otherwise. Anthropic found multi-agent systems use about 15 times more tokens than chat interactions, and that such designs need tasks valuable enough to justify the cost. OpenAI recommends maximizing one agent's capabilities first. Add a second agent when you can point to a specific limitation one agent hit, rather than to an architecture diagram.
- How do I make an AI agent reliable?
- Constrain what it can do and record what it did. Use narrow typed tools rather than open-ended ones, set explicit exit conditions and retry caps, make side effects idempotent so a retry cannot double-charge, enforce permissions in downstream systems rather than in the prompt, and compile any step the agent reasons through identically every run into deterministic code.